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1. Introduction 
 
This article is located in the context of persistent assertions in international legal 
instruments characterising cultural patrimony as being the heritage of humankind.  
The significance of this assertion is contested: it is unclear whether it amounts to a 
claim of “ownership”, a justification for legal protection, or a(nother) piece of 
convenient legal verbiage lacking precise significance or meaning.  Taking account of 
these mutations in meaning, the article traces the emergence of the legal concept of 
cultural heritage with a view to demonstrating that it has always been a critical factor 
in the development of national identity and the securing of national sovereignty.  It 
argues that, in substance, international law has failed to address the significance of 
national cultural patrimony in the development process.  This failure is not only 
manifested by the vague language of international instruments, which do not 
adequately address the connection between concepts of community, nation, state and 
that of cultural heritage.  It is also a consequence of the promotion of an aggressive 
system of intellectual property protection that frequently has the effect of privatizing 
cultural property
1
 in the hands of individuals, corporate or human, when it might be 
more properly managed as a community resource or right.  In the end, one way or 
another, law (mis)appropriates the cultural heritage of communities, nations or states.  
This (mis)appropriation arguably amounts to yet another instance of the denial of any 
meaningful concept of development in international law. 
 
 
2. Heritage, Identity, Sovereignty 
 
                                                          
1
 In general this article uses the expression “cultural property” interchangeably with that of “cultural 
heritage”.  For an account of the movement in international law from the use of the former expression 
to the use of the latter, see J Blake, “On Defining the Cultural Heritage” (2000) 49 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 61-85, at 65-67 .  While Blake’s account explains the advantages of the 
use of “heritage” rather than “property” in terms of the width of its application, I suspect that this 
change in language also obscures the dimensions of the systemic conflict between cultural 
property/heritage and intellectual property, which is one of the themes of this article.  It is notable that 
other writers who are concerned with this conflict, tend to use the expression cultural property, rather 
than cultural heritage: see, eg, J R Slaughter, “Form & Informality: An Unliterary Look at World 
Literature” in R Warhol, The Work of Genre: Selected Essays from the English Institute (English 
Institute in Collaboration with the American Council of Learned Societies, 2011), 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;idno=heb90055, 177-240. 
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The connection between heritage, identity and sovereignty is well known to those 
who have followed the debate in relation to the rights of Indigenous people over their 
cultural heritage.  The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples
2
 contains numerous manifestations of the importance attached to this 
concept,3 which traverse rights in both tangible and intangible heritage.  These 
concepts are found in Articles 11.1, 12.1 and 13.1, which provide respectively: 
[Article 11.1:] Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their 
cultural traditions and customs.  This includes the right to maintain, protect 
and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such 
as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, 
technologies and visual and performing arts and literature. 
[Article 12.1:] Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop 
and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the 
right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and 
cultural sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and 
the right to the repatriation of their human remains. 
[Article 13.1:] Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop 
and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, 
philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their 
own names for communities, places and persons. 
Articles 11.2, 12.2 and 13.2, meanwhile, impose obligations on states with respect to 
the protection of these rights, as well as redress and restitution in cases where the 
rights have been infringed.  The Declaration’s main assertion with respect to cultural 
heritage, however, is in Article 31.1, which also has the effect of linking cultural 
heritage and intellectual property rights: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop 
their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and 
cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge 
of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports 
and traditional games and visual and performing arts.  They also have the right 
to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions. 
The long campaign of Indigenous peoples which resulted in this Declaration is linked 
to a wider agenda of self-determination,4 which is ethically and politically connected 
to the treatment of Indigenous Peoples during the colonial and post-colonial periods.  
This historical context provides a clear basis for distinguishing the claims of 
Indigenous peoples from some other examples where the assertion of rights over 
cultural heritage has become the centrepiece of national identity and/or claims to 
sovereignty. 
                                                          
2
 GA Res. 61/295 (UN Doc. A/61/L.67 and Add.1), adopted on 13 September 2007. 
3
 While at the same time making reference to the ubiquitous concept of the common heritage of 
humankind in a preambular statement that affirms that “all peoples contribute to the diversity and 
richness of civilizations & cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind”. 
4
 Despite Art 46.1 of the Declaration, which apparently represents the type of political & diplomatic 
compromise common in international legal instruments.  It provides: “Nothing in this Declaration may 
be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign & independent States.” 
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In the European context, the assertion of national rights over cultural heritage has 
become part of the policy platform of right-wing and, in some cases, extreme right-
wing parties, the effective claim of which is that national identity is so closely tied up 
with this “heritage” that its relocation is a matter of cultural “right”.  This, for 
example, is part of the platform of the Danish People’s Party.  The Program of which 
contains numerous references to the importance of Danish national cultural heritage.5  
The third of four paragraphs that serve to introduce the Program states: “In the Danish 
People’s Party we are proud of Denmark; we love our country and we feel a historic 
obligation to protect our country, its people and the Danish cultural heritage.”  And 
there is further section concerned specifically with the importance of cultural heritage: 
The country is founded on the Danish cultural heritage and therefore, 
Danish culture must be preserved and strengthened. 
This culture consists of the sum of the Danish people’s history, experience, 
beliefs, language and customs.  Preservation and further development of this 
culture is crucial to the country’s survival as a free and enlightened society. 
Therefore we wish to see action on a broad front to strengthen the Danish 
national heritage everywhere.  Outside Denmark’s borders we would like to 
give financial, political and moral support to Danish minorities.6 
 
In furthering claims based on this platform, this political party has not hesitated to 
misappropriate the discourse on postcolonialism that has sustained the claims of 
Indigenous peoples.7  As Porsdam has shown, this misappropriation is well-illustrated 
in relation to the controversy over the return to Denmark of the surviving versions of 
the Jyske Lov (Jutlandic Law) of 1241, which was in the possession of the Swedish 
Royal Library, having either been purchased by it or bequeathed to it in the early 
eighteenth century.8  Despite the claims of the Danish People’s Party that the case was 
comparable to the dispute in the 1970s over the return to Iceland by Denmark of the 
Icelandic Sagas,9 the two can probably be distinguished, politically at least, on the 
basis of the former imperial relationship between Denmark and Iceland.  During the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Icelandic Sagas had been at the centre of a 
long campaign by Iceland based on the assertion that these manuscripts were central 
to their national identity.  Greenfield observes: 
The significance of these saga manuscripts to the people of Iceland would be 
impossible to exaggerate.  They have been the root and stock of Icelandic 
culture, the lifeblood of the nation, the oldest living literature in Europe, 
enshrining the origins of Icelandic society … Indeed, when the Icelanders took 
                                                          
5
 http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/The_Party_Program_of_the_Danish_Peoples_Party.asp, 29/01/2013.  
My thanks to Professor Helle Porsdam of the University of Copenhagen for drawing my attention to 
this material. 
6
 Note 5 supra. (Bold as in the original.) 
7
 H Porsdam, “Cultural Heritage and Law: The Case of Cultural Looting” in H Porsdam & T Elholm 
(eds), Dialogues on Justice: European Perspectives on Law & Humanities (de Gruyter, 2012) 219-234, 
at 221 & 228-232. 
8
 Porsdam, n 7 supra, at 228-232.   
9
 As to which, see M Rendix, “Copyright as Moral Strategy of Reclaiming the Past: The Return of the 
Icelandic Sagas” in Porsdam & Elholm, n 7 supra, 177-192. 
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up the struggle for freedom and independence from Denmark in the nineteenth 
century, the saga literature was both their inspiration and their justification.
10
 
 
With respect to questions about the relationship between ownership as a legal matter 
and claims for the return of cultural heritage on the basis of some form of national 
right, there is less to distinguish the cases.  Allowing for the fact that the passage of 
time tends to obscure some relevant details, it is arguably the case that the both the 
Icelandic Sagas and the Jutlandic Law were legitimately acquired by Denmark11 and 
Sweden,12 respectively.  This same tension between the question of whether the item 
of cultural heritage was legitimately acquired by the holder and the right (in any case) 
to claim return of such items is a feature of many current controversies.  Other salient 
examples of this are, of course the long running dispute over the Elgin Marbles13 and 
the current claim by Turkey for the return of sculptures from the Mausoleum of 
Halicarnassus, which are currently part of the British Museum collection.14 
 
Given the alleged relationship between national cultural heritage and identity, it is not 
surprising that “ownership” of cultural heritage is also a part of the contested territory 
of sovereignty, and challenges to sovereignty, in a world that is not perhaps quite as 
globalised (for better or worse) as one might sometimes be tempted to think.  
Arguably, the current campaign by Turkey for the return of artefacts that it considers 
its national property,15 of which the claim for the return of the sculptures from the 
Mausoleum of Halicarnassus is one, represents an assertion of sovereignty in the face 
of Western hostility.16  This campaign, however, is one that should be easily 
recognisable to former imperial states, since it appears to have been mounted with the 
intention of stocking an “encyclopaedic museum like the Metropolitan or British 
Museum”.17  As this comment makes clear, the concept of preserving and exhibiting 
cultural heritage in this way is a familiar and comfortable way of expressing a claim 
to identity and sovereignty.  Preservation and conservation of cultural heritage, in 
particular, is a value to which Western society tends to subscribe.18  One consequence 
of this is that claims to proprietary rights over cultural heritage as assertions of 
                                                          
10
 J Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures (Cambridge University Press, 1996), at 4, quoted in 
Rendix, n 9 supra, at 180. 
11
 Rendix, n 9 supra, at 181. 
12
 Porsdam, n 7 supra, at 229. 
13
 See, eg, www.elginism.com, accessed 29/01/2013. 
14
 See, eg, “Turkish campaigners may go to European Court of Human Rights over Mausoleum of 
Halicarnassus in British Museum”, http://www.elginism.com/similar-cases/turkish-compaigners-may-
go-to-european-court-of-human-rights-over-mausoleum-of-halicarnassus-in-british-
museum/20121217/6770/, accessed 29/01/2013. 
15
 See, eg, “Of marbles & men: Turkey gets tough with foreign museums and launches a new culture 
war”, The Economist, 19 May 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21555531, accessed 03/02/2013. 
16
 An example of which is the negative reaction on the part of some states in the European Union to the 
idea of admitting Turkey to the Union.  See also, “Of marbles & men: Turkey gets tough with foreign 
museums & launches a new culture war”, n 15 supra, in which it is observed that “[g]rowing economic 
power & stalled talks over EU membership make many Turks feel that it is time to turn their backs on 
the West.  Amid the turmoil of the Arab spring Turkey believes it can become the leader of the region”. 
17
 A quote attributed to an aide to Turkey’s Minister for Culture & Tourism, Ertugrul Gunay: , “Of 
marbles and men: Turkey gets tough with foreign museums and launches a new culture war”, n 15 
supra. 
18
 See P Yu, “Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property and Intangible Heritage” (2008) 81 Temple Law 
Review 433, at 471-473. 
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sovereignty that involve practices that do not amount to conservation of that cultural 
heritage can be regarded as extremely problematic. 
 
We can all sit around and nod our heads sagely when we are told that the destruction 
by the Zuni of their war gods forms part of a cultural practice that should be respected 
and that the attempt to preserve these gods would be culturally disrespectful;19 or 
likewise, when the Igbo people destroy their mbaris as part of a cultural practice, after 
having painstakingly erected them.20  Yet no such indulgence was evident when the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan dynamited the World Heritage Listed, sixth century 
Buddhas of Bamiyan, having described them as being “idols” and thus religiously 
offensive.  The cases clearly have significant differences, one of the more important 
in cultural terms being that the Taliban were destroying something that belonged not 
to their own culture, but arguably to someone else’s, although they claimed a cultural 
imperative for the act of destruction.  However, the Bamiyan Buddhas case is 
probably most interesting because of its significance in geo-political terms.  A 
reasonable argument might be made that this was much more than a mere act of 
cultural destruction.  It was, rather, an aggressive assertion of sovereignty, not to 
mention a clear rejection of any meaningful concept of the common heritage of 
humanity, in favour of a claim that the Buddhas were part of their national cultural 
patrimony to do with as they wished. 
 
 
3. The Common Heritage of Humanity? 
 
Of course, most controversies involving some sort of national, local or community 
assertion of rights over cultural heritage do not, as a matter of logical necessity, 
involve the rejection of the concept of the common heritage of humankind.  Instead 
they tend to involve some contingent claim that, for one reason or another, is said to 
trump or displace other claims.  For example, it is not necessarily clear that claims 
made by the British Museum to retain their extensive collection of heritage objects 
from all around the world involve a rejection of the concept of the common heritage 
of humanity in favour of some claim to national rights over the contents of the 
Museum.  Rather the Director of the Museum, Ewan McGregor, claims that they are 
in the best position to conserve the artefacts and to present this “encyclopaedic 
collection”21 - a position that Sharon Waxman scathingly describes as “this new 
philosophy for a multicultural age”.22  There is also a faux naivety in this idea of the 
“encyclopaedic collection” as though it was somehow free of the circumstances in 
which it was formed, and as though all the components of the collection will look 
                                                          
19
 S Harding, “Value, Obligation & Cultural Heritage” (1999) 31 Arizona State Law Journal 291, at 
312; R W Mastalir, “A Proposal for Protecting the ‘Cultural’ & ‘Property’ Aspects of Cultural Property 
under International Law” (1993) 16 Fordham International Law Journal 1033, at 1038; Yu, n 18 
supra, at 476-478. 
20
 See Harding, n 19 supra, 309-312; Yu, n 18 supra, 476-478. 
21
  N MacGregor, “Preface” in K Sloan (ed), Enlightenment: Discovering the World in the 
Eighteenth Century (British Museum Press, 2004), 6.  See also, N MacGregor, “To Shape the Citizens 
of ‘that great city, the world’” in J Cuno (ed), Whose Culture? The Promise of Museums & the Debate 
over Antiquities (Princeton University Press, 2009), 39-54. 
22
 S Waxman, Loot: The Battle Over the Stolen Treasures of the Ancient World (Times Books, Henry 
Holt & Co, 2008), at 212. 
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exactly the same from wherever they are viewed.
23
  Observations made by Slaughter 
when addressing the concept of “the centre” in the intangible cultural heritage of 
world literature seem apposite here: 
[T]he core defines the norms and forms that make it the core; it defines itself 
as center … We should remember, here at the center, that the core is the core 
not because it is the source of things, but because it is a collection of things … 
[T]he center absorbs everything; it … treats everywhere else and everything 
else as raw materials to be extracted, exploited, accumulated, and privatized 
…[T]he center is never simply a given or merely an object; it is the effect of a 
certain way of seeing and speaking, of gathering an analyzing data.24 
 
What McGregor does not say, because he is obviously alive to the dangers of it, is that 
the great metropolitan museums, like the British Museum, are of course a sort of 
physical embodiment of the history of imperialism.  This is a description that the 
British Museum may not be willing to embrace, but in some senses it could be taken 
as the basis for an argument that the British Museum has some particular interest, 
beyond the presentation of an encyclopaedic collection, in keeping all this looted stuff 
because it is part of British history, and thus perhaps of British cultural heritage – 
although maybe this confuses history with heritage.  However, if the British Museum 
could make such a claim then how would it relate to claims for return of artefacts to 
former colonies, and to communities within former colonies, on the basis of their 
significance to history and identity.  Whose claim trumps whose? 
 
All these types of controversies, and their intensely political nature, clearly have the 
capacity to complicate how we talk about ownership of, or rights over, cultural 
heritage at any level more specific than common heritage of humanity.  However, the 
concept of the common heritage of humanity does not necessarily preclude us from 
talking at the same time about national, local or community rights or responsibilities 
in relation to heritage.  This is to say that the battle over the ownership of cultural 
heritage has always been an ongoing battle over history and how it relates to, or is 
translated into present day identity. 
 
 
4. Cultural Heritage in International Law 
 
The trajectory of international law in this area is clearly marked by precisely this 
battle.  And like the controversies over the collections in the great metropolitan 
museums, it also tends to reveal the rather contingent historical and political nature of 
at least some “national” and local claims to cultural heritage. 
 
Although disputes about ownership of cultural artefacts go back to antiquity,25 cultural 
heritage first became a recognised concept in international law at the time of the 
Vienna Treaty of 1815,26 which was imposed by the British victors after the 
                                                          
23
 See further G Rose, Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to Researchng with Visual Materials (3
rd
 
ed, Sage, 2012) .  My thanks to Professor Amanda Perry-Kessaris for this reference. 
24
 Slaughter, n 1 supra, at 196. 
25
 See M M Miles, Art as Plunder: The Ancient Origins of Debate about Cultural Property 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
26
 A F Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums & the Return of Cultural Objects (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), at 23-29. 
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conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars.  One of the things that the British insisted upon 
was the return of movable artefacts of “cultural heritage” looted by Napoleon during 
his campaigns.  This was very much a punitive clause, but it carried with it the rise of 
a discourse that linked people, territory and cultural objects.27  Naturally, the discourse 
was essentially European in perspective, but even more it was guided by British 
imperial claims.  A stroll through the Italian galleries in the Louvre makes it clear that 
a substantial collection of Venetian artworks, looted by Napoleon, remain in French 
possession.  The British, it seems, may have been less than diligent in enforcing the 
terms of the Vienna Treaty when they did not relate directly to British interests.  The 
Venetians, however, did get back the famous horses of San Marco, one of the 
symbols of their city.  The extent to which this might be considered a victory of 
cultural heritage rights perhaps needs to be considered in light of the fact that the 
Venetians had looted the horses from Corinth several centuries earlier.  In fact, this 
example is illustrative of a perennial issue with respect to national or local rights in 
cultural heritage, which is that the passage of time, along with the mutations of 
nationality and national borders, tend to introduce a certain fragility into some current 
assertions of national ownership.  For example, the fact that the sculptures from the 
Mausoleum of Halicarnassus, the subject of Turkey’s claim against the British 
Museum, were made by Greek sculptors28 is not without some resonance in this 
context.29 
 
The period prior to the conclusive end of British dominance, which was definitely 
dead by the end of the Second World War,30 was, amongst other significant events in 
the present context,31 characterised by the systematic removal of cultural objects, 
without any sense of moral culpability, from the “outposts” of the Empire.32  The 
subsequent treatment of this process of removal, under both international law and 
under the administrative practice of former metropolitan states, in the period of de-
colonisation after the end of the Second World War has laid the groundwork for the 
issues with which this article is most closely concerned.  There are three inter-related 
aspects of the terrain of international law that need to be taken into account in order to 
reflect on the trajectory of international law and its impact on the relationship between 
development and cultural heritage rights. 
 
                                                          
27
 Vrdoljak, n 26 supra, 13, citing W G Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (trans & rev M 
Byers) (Berlin: 2000), xviii. 
28
 “Of marbles & men: Turkey gets tough with foreign museums & launches a new culture war”, n 15 
supra. 
29
 Another example of this type of problem relates to the murals of Bruno Schulz: see M Bruncevic, 
“The Lost Mural of Bruno Schulz: A Critical Legal Perspective on Control, Access to & Ownership of 
Art” (2011) 22 Law & Critique 79-96. 
30
 G Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times (Verso, 1994), 
at 47-74 & ch 3. 
31
 Including: the conclusion of the first specific international law instrument designed to protect 
cultural heritage (1907 Hague Regulations on Law & Customs of War: protection of historic 
buildings); & the rise of ideology in European fascist states that postulated the destruction or removal 
of cultural objects as essential to eradicating the identity & existence of certain groups. 
32
 Special Rapporteur, Mohammed Bedjaoui, who was responsible for the preparation the work that 
eventually lead to the conclusion of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts (1983) found that the removal of cultural objects during the colonial 
period was generally not “in accordance with the canons of justice, morality and law”: UN 
Doc.A/CN.4/292, quoted in Vrdoljak, n 26 supra, 202. 
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First of all, there is the very process of decolonization itself and the political 
aspirations that accompanied it.  At the international law level, this process was 
managed in a rather ex post facto fashion by something that eventually became yet 
another in the extensive collection of “Vienna” treaties and conventions.  This was the 
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives 
and Debts of 1983.  In the current context there are two key (low) points of this treaty.  
The first of these is its failure to recognise the distinctive position of Indigenous 
peoples within former colonial subject states.  This, of course, is a serious problem 
with which the international law system continues to struggle.  In part, it was a 
consequence of the strongly state-based thinking that characterized the development 
of international law in the post-war period.  This explanation (the inadequacy and 
injustice of which needs no elaboration), however, cannot serve to explain the second 
important aspect of the Vienna Convention, which is the absence of any rules on 
restitution of works of art or artefacts to the former colonial states.  Instead, the 
question of the return of works of art and artefacts was to be governed by bilateral 
negotiations under the auspices of a UNESCO Committee, the operation of which has 
continued up until to the present period.33  What makes this particularly pernicious is 
the stark contrast between the arrangements that the colonial powers, comprising a 
number of European states, made with respect to the return of artefacts to their former 
colonies and the arrangements that they made for the return of what they considered 
to be their own artefacts under the Allied Restitution programmes that followed the 
conclusion of the Second World War.34 
 
The second of the three important developments in international law in the post-
colonial period was the re-institutionalisation of the concept of free trade.  This 
occurred as a result of the Bretton Woods negotiations at the conclusion of the Second 
World War, and specifically the conclusion of the GATT, which constituted part of 
Roosevelt’s envisaged re-making of the world systems.  The concept of international 
free trade had been floating around since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1649, which had 
abolished trade barriers and sought to protect the rights of private enterprise to trade 
across state borders, even during times of war or other political turmoil.35  While the 
economic freedoms of Westphalia were not observed during the Napoleonic Wars, 
they were restored in the Settlement of Vienna of 1815 and the Congress of Aix-la-
Chapelle of 1818.36  And then these freedoms were restored again, after the 
cataclysms of the First and Second World Wars, at Bretton Woods, starting the 
international legal system(s) on a process that has lead eventually to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
 
Thirdly, the post-colonial period has also witnessed the development of the UNESCO 
regime for the protection of “culture”, within the international law context of the 
Dumbarton Oaks system.  The Dumbarton Oaks system, arising from the Dumbarton 
Oaks negotiations also at the end of the Second World War, set up the UN system and 
set the scene for much of what we now call public international law.  The UNESCO 
Conventions started off with a concern for the protection of cultural property during 
                                                          
33
 For a critical assessment of the work of this committee, see Vrdoljak, n 26 supra, 211-217. 
34
 Vrdoljak, n 26 supra, 202. And for an account of the Allied Restitution programmes in this context, 
see Vrdoljak, ibid., 140-148. 
35
 Arrighi, n 30 supra, 43-44. 
36
 Arrighi, n 30 supra, 52. 
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armed conflict (UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict (Hague Convention, 1954)), moved on a concern for 
restitution to states of movable cultural property (UNESCO Convention on the Means 
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit, Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property (1970)), and then the preservation of immovable cultural property 
(UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage (1972)).  In this century, while the rate of international law-making with 
respect to the protection of culture and cultural heritage has increased, the focus of 
protection has moved to a concern for underwater cultural heritage (UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001)) intangible 
cultural heritage (UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage (2003)) and the concept of “cultural diversity” (UNESCO Convention for 
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005)). 
 
What is particularly important and interesting about this UNESCO regime is that it is 
marked by its reactions to both the process of decolonisation and the growth and 
development of free trade theory.  Despite using the language of the cultural heritage 
of mankind/humanity, the regime is intensely statist, which is also (obviously) a 
consequence of its location in the system of international law.  This, of course, 
reflects the strongly statist ideology that characterised the period of decolonisation.  
There are now some small breaches in this discourse as witnessed at the general level 
on public international law, for example, in the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 and reflected in the UNESCO Convention for 
the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage37 and the Convention for the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.38  At the same 
time, and arguably running counter to this strongly statist approach, the ambit of the 
UNESCO regime is circumscribed by the dominance of free trade ideology and the 
associated importance of private ownership rights.  One classic example of this is the 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit, Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 1970, which makes its 
provisions on the return of moveable cultural property subject to ensuring 
compensation for “innocent” purchasers and persons “who have valid titles” to the 
relevant artefacts.39  The Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions is also marked by the dominance of free trade ideology.  In 
one way, its very existence can be considered a reaction to the international legal 
implementation of that ideology in the WTO agreements.  This is because one of 
primary motivations of the Convention’s promoters was to compensate for the 
absence of a general cultural exception in the WTO agreements.40  However, it might 
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 Which recognises in its recitals “that communities, in particular indigenous communities, groups 
and, in some cases, individuals, play an important role in the production, safeguarding, maintenance 
and recreation of the intangible cultural heritage …”; & also recognises the role of communities & 
groups in Art 2.1. 
38
 Which makes repeated references to “traditional cultural expressions” & notes in its Recitals “the 
importance of the vitality of cultures, including for persons belonging to minorities & indigenous 
peoples, as manifested in their freedom to create, disseminate & distribute their traditional cultural 
expressions & to have access thereto, so as to benefit them for their own development”. 
39
 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting & Preventing the Illicit, Import, Export & 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970), Art 7(b)(ii). 
40
 See further C B Graber, “The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: A Counterbalance 
to the WTO?” (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 553-574. 
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also be regarded as accommodating aspects of the ideology underpinning the WTO 
through its uncritical acceptance of the role of private property rights, in the form of 
intellectual property rights, in sustaining the type of cultural creativity that it regards 
as essential to the flourishing of cultural diversity.41  A similar uncritical acceptance 
characterises the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage.42  Given the historical intertwining of the trade regime and the UNESCO 
regime, it is probably not surprising that UNESCO’s increasing concern with the 
protection of intangibles has been matched by an enormous growth in the scope and 
application of intellectual property rights - classically private proprietary rights over 
intangibles – which are now part of the WTO package in the form of its Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs Agreement).  The minor 
inconvenience flowing from the fact that this Agreement does not fit within the 
neoclassical account of free trade upon which the WTO claims to find its theoretical 
basis and justification, has been conveniently forgotten. 
 
 
5. Cultural Heritage and Decolonization 
 
In light of the foregoing, this current period of decolonization can be regarded as 
generating three outstanding issues in relation to the question of who owns cultural 
heritage.  These are: first, the question of how we mediate claims that cultural “stuff” 
is the common heritage of humanity, with the particular claims of developing 
countries and Indigenous Peoples; secondly, the question of tangibility and 
intangibility, and its relationship to the privatization of cultural heritage; and, thirdly, 
the question of whether it is possible to find a meaningful accommodation of co-
existing claims to private and some form of public or communal ownership of cultural 
heritage. 
 
5.1 Claims of developing countries and Indigenous peoples 
There are some common issues that arise when considering the question of the 
mediation of general claims to the common heritage of humanity with particular 
claims of developing countries and Indigenous peoples.  Nevertheless, such claims by 
developing countries and Indigenous peoples are distinct and should not, therefore be 
elided.  For developing countries, attempting to build a national identity, sometimes 
from scratch, and to forge it around often invented/artificially constructed national 
symbolism, the failure to return significant forms of cultural heritage has been in 
some cases viewed as a denial of the right of to exist.43  Despite the statist focus of the 
UNESCO Conventions, they have been of little assistance to developing countries 
with respect to tangible cultural heritage because of their resolutely non-retroactive 
effect.  The irony of this is particularly marked in relation to the Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, Article 2 of which provides: 
                                                          
41
 According to its Recitals, the Convention recognises “the importance of intellectual property rights 
in sustaining those involved in cultural creativity”; & see Art 20.  For a further analysis, see F 
Macmillan, “The UNESCO Convention as a New Incentive to Protect Cultural Diversity” in H 
Schneider & P van den Bossche (eds), Protection of Cultural Diversity from a European and 
International Perspective (Intersentia, 2008), 163-192. 
42
 See Art 3(b). 
43
 For a discussion of the importance of the restitution of cultural artefacts to former colonial states, see 
Vrdoljak, n 26 supra, at 200-206. 
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The States Parties to this Convention recognize that the illicit import, export 
and transfer of cultural property is one of the main causes of the 
impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such 
property and that international co-operation constitutes one of the most 
efficient means of protecting each country’s cultural property against all the 
dangers resulting there from. 
The fact that the Convention, and its more recent partner the UNIDROIT Convention 
on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 1995,44 apply to moveable tangible 
property and that both Conventions clearly envisage that such property is national in 
nature would seem to make them well-adapted to the task of recognizing the cultural 
interests at play here.  However, the Conventions only apply to activities undertaken 
from the time they came into force,45 which means are they are more or less irrelevant, 
in a strictly legal sense, to the claims of developing countries for restitution of objects 
removed during the colonial period.  On the other hand, symbolically they might be 
regarded as stating an ethical position that should be recognised by the international 
community.46  In this respect, it is interesting to note that the UNIDROIT Convention 
notes that, despite its lack of retrospectivity, it “does not in any way legitimise any 
illegal transaction … which has taken place before the entry into force of this 
Convention … nor limit any right of a State or other person to make a claim under 
remedies available outside the framework of this Convention for the restitution or 
return of a cultural object stolen or illegally exported before the entry into force of 
this Convention”. 
 
For Indigenous groups, the question of the right to control of cultural heritage is 
linked to questions of identity, survival and the political project of self-determination, 
in a world that is dominated by the Westphalian state-based system of sovereignty and 
law-making.  Representing some changes in political awareness, the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention recognises the existence of “national, tribal, indigenous or other 
communities” and introduces some procedural rules about claims in the light of this.  
Its applicability is, of course, limited by the problem of retrospectivity.  However, 
given that Indigenous peoples lack the protection of statehood and are still at the 
whim of the nation states in which they live, the Convention might be regarded as 
having slightly more utility in a temporal sense. Running counter to this suggestion 
are the facts that: first, the Convention envisages the need for a co-operative 
relationship between these groups and the state or states in which they live in relation 
to the international claims for return with which it is concerned; and, secondly, the 
fact that it only deals with international claims means that it says nothing about claims 
by Indigenous Peoples against the states in which they live.  It is interesting, perhaps 
                                                          
44
 Which introduces a more complex legal architecture in order to support the UNESCO Convention 
on the Means of Prohibiting & Preventing the Illicit Import, Export & Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property. 
45
 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting & Preventing the Illicit Import, Export & 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Art 7; UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally 
Exported Cultural Objects of 1995, Art 10. 
46
 Although the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting & Preventing the Illicit Import, Export & 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Art 4, makes cultural property that has been removed with 
the consent of the competent authorities (paras (c) & (e) or “been the subject of a freely agreed 
exchange” part of the patrimony of the state in which it is located.  The application of this provision to 
artefacts taken during the colonial period would be the source of endless conflicts about what was 
“looted” & what was not.  As argued above, in the post-colonial context this is not only difficult to 
substantiate, but more importantly beside the point. 
12 
 
to note that, in any case, of the most important states for these purposes,47 only New 
Zealand is a member of the UNIDROIT Convention. 
 
5.2 Tangibility, intangibility and the privatization of cultural heritage 
In cultural terms, the significance of the distinction between tangible and intangible 
heritage can be easily exaggerated.  This is because what makes a tangible item 
heritage is precisely its symbolic value.  In other words even tangible items are only 
heritage because of an intangible connection.48  This putative distinction, which is 
derived from occidental legal ordering, is however reflected in the UNESCO 
approach to the protection of cultural heritage.  While UNESCO’s twentieth century 
Conventions focused largely on the question of the protection of tangibles, this 
century has seen a turn towards the protection of the intangible with the conclusion of 
the eponymous Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 
and of the Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions.  In fact, both Conventions disrupt to some extent the previous 
practice of attempting to separate the tangible and the intangible.  The Convention on 
Intangible Cultural includes within its definition of intangible cultural heritage 
“instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces” associated with “practices, 
representations, expressions, knowledge, skills … that communities, groups and, in 
some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage”.49  The Cultural 
Diversity Convention recognises that both the tangible and intangible are part of the 
diversity of cultures.50  Neither Convention, however, has much to offer to either 
Indigenous peoples or developing countries when it comes to the protection of their 
intangible cultural heritage, despite their objections to the Western appropriation of a 
wide range of things such as traditional medical or environmental knowledge, know-
how, stories, artistic styles, music, dance, festivals, carnivals and other ceremonies.  
This appropriation, apart from being problematic in itself, has raised problems with 
respect to inappropriate use.51  There are also circumstances in which this 
appropriation can interfere with the ability of Indigenous peoples or communities in 
the developing world to access, use and reflect upon their own intangible cultural 
heritage.  This happens as a consequence of appropriation of this heritage by making 
it subject to intellectual property rights, which is considered below. 
 
However, it should be noted that the problems of access to intangible heritage are not 
limited to the issue of private appropriation through intellectual property rights.  As 
Stoler has shown, developing countries have also suffered from another problem with 
respect to access to their intangible cultural heritage.52  This relates to access to 
information on state administration during the colonial period.  While the 1983 
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives 
and Debts required the return of some types of state papers and archives, it does not 
address the “know-how” of state administration (including the legal system) with the 
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 Meaning states within which there is are substantial groups of Indigenous peoples, such as Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, & the United States. 
48
 See Blake, n 1 supra, at 67-69. 
49
 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Art 2.1. 
50
 Eg, through its recognition of the role of “cultural goods”: UNESCO Convention on the Protection 
& Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Art 4.4. 
51
 For a full discussion of this problem, see Yu, n 18 supra. 
52
 L A Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance” (2002) 2 Archival Science 87-109. 
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result that many developing counties claim that effective state-building has been 
almost impossible.53 
 
5.3 Public v private claims to cultural heritage 
The problem of mediating co-existing claims to private and some form of public or 
communal ownership of cultural property, is a problem that exists with respect to both 
tangibles and intangibles.  As already noted, the importance of respecting private 
property rights in relation to moveable heritage was regarded as so paramount by the 
metropolitan powers that the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
makes special provision to ensure that it is respected and that proper compensation is 
paid to a property holder.  If anything, the situation with respect to the protection of 
private property rights over intangible forms of cultural heritage is even more biased 
in favour of the private right holder, with this century’s UNESCO Conventions 
simply ceding the ground.54  Certainly, this accommodating approach does nothing to 
contradict claims that appropriation through intellectual property is the new form of 
imperialism.55  For developing countries and Indigenous peoples, not only is there the 
problem of the appropriation of cultural heritage through a discourse that claims their 
heritage as the patrimony of humankind – some sort of global patrimony – but also, 
the problem of the appropriation by private corporate interests, usually in the global 
north, of intangible heritage.  The types of intangible cultural heritage that might be 
appropriated through intellectual property rights have already been mentioned.  So far 
as, for example, traditional medical knowledge is concerned, there is a plethora of 
examples of the way in which this type of intangible heritage can be appropriated by 
pharmaceutical corporations through the use of patents.  Similarly, for example, with 
respect to stories, songs and music there are serious issues about the appropriation of 
intangible heritage by, for example, the entertainment industry represented by the 
Hollywood machine.  (Of course, the recent development of national film industries in 
countries like Nigeria and South Korea, as well as the continuing power of 
Bollywood, constitutes a welcome counter-movement to the Hollywood machine.) 
 
Not only does all this, add another possible layer onto the question of “who owns 
cultural heritage?”, but it also means that somehow the relationship between the 
private rights and the more public or communal rights inherent in identifying 
something as cultural heritage must be negotiated.  A negotiation of this type must 
depend upon some choice as to which rights should prevail.  In the post-colonial 
context there is strong argument in favour of giving precedence to cultural heritage 
rights over intellectual property rights and other private property rights.  Three 
arguments might be cited in support of this proposition.  The first is simply that the 
importance of cultural heritage to processes like nation-building and self-
determination, as well as its importance for the identity of Indigenous peoples, should 
be regarded as giving it precedence over private rights on the grounds of ethics, 
justice and the right to development.  Secondly, it could be argued that, in relation to 
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 See Vrdoljak, n 26 supra, at 205. 
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 See text acc nn 41 & 42 supra. 
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 See, eg, Rendix, n 9 supra, at 191-2. See also Slaughter, n 1 supra, esp at 198-99, who argues that 
the distinction between the developed and developing world is reflected in the idea that the former has 
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appropriation. 
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tangible heritage, the international community has already made a political choice to 
favour cultural heritage rights over private property rights.  This choice is expressed 
in the both UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and the 
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 1995, in 
which private property rights are recognised by a right to compensation in certain 
circumstances, but cannot be relied upon to prevent the return of stolen or illegally 
exported cultural artefacts.  This approach dovetails with the third argument in favour 
of preferring cultural heritage claims over private property claims, which is that this 
approach gives scope to both types of claims whereas giving precedence to private 
property claims effectively extinguishes cultural heritage claims.  Whether property 
said to constitute cultural heritage is tangible or intangible its essential features seems 
to be: first, that it is “owned” publicly or, at least, in common; and, secondly, that the 
ownership rights focus on preservation (loosely conceived), access and the sharing of 
benefits associated with it.  These rights cannot be exercised if private property rights 
are given precedence.  Certainly, it is also true that one of the most significant roles of 
cultural heritage rights is to prevent or limit the privatisation of that cultural heritage.  
Sometimes this might mean preventing the possibility of private ownership rights 
altogether, but this is not necessarily the case.  There may be circumstances, 
particularly with respect to intellectual property rights, where the range of right 
holders might be circumscribed without preventing more general access.56  In any 
case, it should be possible to find mechanisms either in property law, including 
intellectual property law, or external to it that carve a public or communal space out 
of the privatised space of property law.57  The fact that the law, to date, has a poor 
track record in this respect only invests the project with more urgency. 
 
 
6. Conclusion? 
 
What does it mean, in the end, to say as UNESCO instruments do with such 
predictable regularity, that cultural heritage is the common heritage of humanity?  Is it 
a claim to ownership or is it a justification for special status and protection? Is it a 
ground upon which to argue, for example, that diversity is what makes us human?  Or 
a ground upon which to argue that wanton acts of destruction harm the humanity of us 
all?  As Blake notes, there is an “inherent contradiction” in characterizing something 
as the common heritage of humanity “while at the same time noting its power in 
asserting the cultural identity of the community which produced it”.58  Yet the 
assertion of a general claim on the basis of common humanity is not without value. 
 
History shows us that it is not possible to de-couple cultural heritage from particular 
identities, national, communal or otherwise.  But it is not clear that this always 
implies the right to make a claim for “ownership”, which might in any case be better 
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understood as a form of stewardship.59  Political context is clearly significant here.  
The post-colonial context, with its urgent demands for justice, makes claims for return 
of artefacts by Indigenous Peoples in Australia different to claims by right wing 
governments or political parties in Europe.  The pressing need to recognise that 
cultural heritage is critical to identity, nation-building and sovereignty, and that any 
notion of a right to development is meaningless without these things, does not just 
mean that the claims by developing countries to the return of their artefacts taken 
during the colonial period must be taken seriously by the international community.  It 
also requires a recognition that they have rights over their intangible heritage which 
impact on, for example, its wholesale appropriation as part of the Hollywood 
machine. 
 
“Too much”, Lowenthal writes, “is asked of heritage.  In the same breath we 
commend national patrimony, regional and ethnic legacies and a global heritage 
shared and sheltered in common.  We forget that these aims are usually 
incompatible.”60  If the cultural heritage claims arising from the oppressive legacy of 
the colonial period were accepted on the basis that in the name of a right to 
development they are politically distinguishable from other types of claims, we might 
find this problem easier to resolve.  Attention could then be turned to asking even 
more of heritage – or at least of rights in relation to it.  Now we need heritage rights to 
fend off the new imperialism of private appropriation of culture, especially as it 
operates through the global system of intellectual property rights ushered in through 
the WTO TRIPs Agreement. 
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